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the events. The Diplomacy is meticulous in its contents, the books covers almost everything from the 17th century up until the very end of the statesman, how the formation of Political orders and then the world
orders in recently been shaken by different expansionists and imperialist leaders. It is a sweeping history of political events and the role of the statesman in forming the next order to replace the previous one in the event of its expulsion. The book start with the Time of Richelieu's France in the middle 17th century, it talks about how the medieval
European dream of Universalism have never succeeded, hitherto the European wanted to have a universal church, but the arrival of Richelieu in the French command led the Europe from Universalism to the equilibrium, he brought the Raison de'tat (National interest) politics in France first, and this policy if pursuing national
interest would justify whatever means to pursue it, then the book talk about the French (Richelieu, Napoleon), Prussia
which is now Germany (Otto wan Bismarck, it was he who unified the different German in the 19th century), lastly British (Palmerson/Disraeli), beside this the role of the Russian and Austrian isn't negligible either, they have also contributed vastly in various European diplomatic events. The
politics in Europe from the times of Richelieu was that of National interest, and then Bismarck introduced Realpolitik (Which means the same thing as Raison de'tat), in this tussle of dominance grew the concept of balance of power, which was vital to the survival of the weaker as well as, so the British policy in those days was to wait for anyone to
disturb the balance so then they act against the agrresor, complying always with the weaker against the Europe, and hence threatened everyone, whereas the Bismarck, the German statesman, his policy was more of partnership to join with as many as partners and stop the
danger from arising by overlapping policies and partnership with the rivals, it was the brilliance of Bismarck that he led Germans to great power he will look for adventures under others
leaders and so was happened as seen in the 2 world wars. In the policies of Richelieu, and in the treaty of Westphalia Europe seen the peace for the longest Duration in its entire history, for about 150 years from 1648 to Napoleon times in the late 18th century, After the defeat of Napoleon in Waterloo, European nation's sits together again in 1814 and
established a treaty of Vienna, which saw the peace for almost a century except few battles such as Crimean war, then in 1914 we all know about the great casualties of the first world war which again destroyed the peace of Europe, the war ended in 1918, and the treaties of Versailles was signed, and the league of nations formed. German were
sanctioned, there powers were curbed, they were heavily fined and were in complete disaster and economic collapse, so then in 1930s it was the Streseman, the German Diplomat who worked very hard to revive Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to German Diplomat who worked very hard to revive Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to German Diplomat who worked very hard to revive Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany, and open the way for American aids and loans to Germany aids and loans aids and loa
power in 1933 first as a chancellor then as a dictator, then the book covers the second world war, and the events afterwards, the order of the world after the second world war, it talks about the rise of Russia from the WW2, and then the start of the cold war with Russian, and American containment policies for the spread of communism, it also talks
about the Vietnam war, Cuban missile threats, the building up of the Berlin Wall in 1961 by the Russian leaders post Lenin, Stalin, Khurseavic, and the cold war, the Russian leaders post Lenin, Stalin, Khurseavic, and the post cold war world. As about the post cold war world.
great knowledgeable book, full with lots of historical events, facts and stories ...more CHAPTER ONE The New World Order Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own
values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of the balance of power, which dominated European diplomacy for the
next 200 years. In the nineteenth century, Metternich's Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck's Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics. In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the
United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions.
No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope. The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy.
democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between isolationism and commitment, though, since the end of the
Second World War, the realities of interdependence have predominated. Both schools of thought—of America as beacon and of America as crusader—envision as normal a global international order based on democracy, free commerce, and international law. Since no such system has ever existed, its evocation often appears to other societies as
utopian, if not naïve. Still, foreign skepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or indeed of all other twentieth-century America's faith that history can be overcome and that if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America's moral
prescriptions. Both schools of thought were products of the American experience. Though other republics have existed, none had been consciously created to vindicate the idea of liberty. No other country's population had chosen to head for a new continent and tame its wilderness in the name of freedom and prosperity for all. Thus the two
approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, so contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith: that the United States possessed the world's best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and
democracy. America's journey through international politics in 1917, it has been a triumph of faith over experience. Since the time America entered the arena of world politics in 1917, it has been a triumph of faith over experience.
values—from the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The collapse of Soviet communism marked the intellectual vindication of American ideals and, ironically, brought America face to face with the kind of world it had been seeking to escape throughout its history. In the emerging
international order, nationalism has gained a new lease on life. Nations have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead. What is new about
the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. America cannot change the way it has perceived its role throughout its history, nor should it want to. When America cannot change the way it has perceived its role throughout its history, nor should it want to.
vision of international relations. By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States was so powerful (at one point about 35 percent of the world's entire economic production was American) that it seemed as if it was destined to shape the world according to its preferences. John F. Kennedy declared confidently in 1961 that America was
strong enough to pay any price, bear any burden to ensure the success of liberty. Three decades later, the United States is in less of a position to insist on the immediate realization of all its desires. Other countries have grown into Great Power status. The United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an
amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities. One of the new necessities is that a world comprising several states of comparable strength must base its order on some concept of equilibrium—an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable. When American thinking on foreign policy and European diplomatic traditions
encountered each other at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the differences in historical experience became dramatically evident. The European leaders sought to refurbish the existing system according to familiar methods; the American peacemakers believed that the Great War had resulted not from intractable geopolitical conflicts but from
flawed European practices. In his famous Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson told the Europeans that, henceforth, the international system should be based not on military alliances but on collective security, and that their diplomacy should no longer be
conducted secretly by experts but on the basis of open agreements, openly arrived at. Clearly, Wilson had come not so much to discuss the terms for ending a war or for restoring the existing international order, as he had to recast a whole system of international relations as it had been practiced for nearly three centuries. For as long as Americans
have been reflecting on foreign policy, they have ascribed Europe's travails to the balance-of-power system. And since the time Europe first had to concern itself with American foreign policy, its leaders have looked askance at American's self-appointed mission of global reform. Each side has behaved as if the other had freely chosen its mode of
diplomatic behavior and could have, were it wiser or less bellicose, selected some other, more agreeable, method. In fact, both the American and the European approaches to foreign policy were the products of their own unique circumstances. Americans inhabited a nearly empty continent shielded from predatory powers by two vast oceans and with
weak countries as neighbors. Since America confronted no power in need of being balanced, it could hardly have occupied itself with the challenges of equilibrium even if its leaders had been seized by the bizarre notion of replicating European conditions amidst a people who had turned their backs on Europe. The anguishing dilemmas of security that
tormented European nations did not touch America for nearly 150 years. When they did, America twice participated in the world wars which had been started by the nations of Europe. In each instance, by the time America got involved, the balance of power, which most
Americans disdained, in fact assured American security as long as it functioned as it was designed; and that it was its breakdown that drew America into internations out of innate quarrelsomeness or an Old World love of intrigue. If the
emphasis on democracy and international law was the product of America's unique sense of security, European diplomacy had been forged in the school of hard knocks. Europe was thrown into balance-of-power politics when its first choice, the medieval dream of universal empire, collapsed and a host of states of more or less equal strength arose
from the ashes of that ancient aspiration. When a group of states so constituted are obliged to deal with one another, there are only two possible outcomes: either one state becomes so strong that it dominates all the others and creates an empire, or no state is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that goal. In the latter case, the pretensions of the
most aggressive member of the international community are kept in check by a combination of the others; in other words, by the operation of a balance of power. The balance-of-power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of
conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By definition, a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order. Theorists of the balance of
power often leave the impression that it is the natural form of international relations. In fact, balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in human history. The Western Hemisphere has never known one, nor has the territory of contemporary China since the end of the period of the warring states, over 2,000 years ago. For the greatest part of
humanity and the longest periods of history, empire has been the typical mode of government. Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy in the Americas, and China
through most of its history in Asia. In the West, the only examples of functioning balance-of-power systems were among the city-states of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, and the European state system which arose out of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The distinguishing feature of these systems was to elevate a fact of life—the existence of a
number of states of substantially equal strength—into a guiding principle of world order. Intellectually, the concept of the Enlightenment. In their view, the universe, including the political sphere, operated according to rational principles which balanced each other.
Seemingly random acts by reasonable men would, in their totality, tend toward the common good, though the proof of this proposition was elusive in the century of almost constant conflict that followed the Thirty Years' War. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, maintained that an invisible hand would distill general economic well-being out of
selfish individual economic actions. In The Federalist Papers, Madison argued that, in a large enough republic, the various political factions selfishly pursuing their own interests would, by a kind of automatic mechanism, forge a proper domestic harmony. The concepts of the separation of powers and of checks and balances, as conceived by
Montesquieu and embodied in the American Constitution, reflected an identical view. The purpose of the separation of powers was to avoid despotism, not to achieve harmonious government; each branch of the government, in the pursuit of its own interests, would restrain excess and thereby serve the common good. The same principles were applied
to international affairs. By pursuing its own selfish interests, each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state was presumed to contribute to progress.
Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe restored the balance of power at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and softened the brutal reliance on power by seeking to moderate international conduct through moral and legal bonds. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the European balance-of-power system returned to the principles of power politics
and in a far more unforgiving environment. Facing down the adversary became the standard method of diplomacy, leading to one test of strength after another. Finally, in 1914, a crisis arose from which no one shrank. Europe never fully recovered world leadership after the catastrophe of the First World War. The United States emerged as the
dominant player but Woodrow Wilson soon made it clear that his country refused to play by European rules. At no time in its history has America benefited from the operation of the balance of power without being involved in its maneuvers, and while enjoying the luxury of
castigating it at will. During the Cold War, America was engaged in an ideological, political, and strategic struggle with the Soviet Union in which a two-power world, there can be no pretense that conflict leads to the common good; any gain
for one side is a loss for the other. Victory without war was in fact what America achieved in the Cold War, a victory which has now obliged it to confront the dilemma described by George Bernard Shaw: There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it. American leaders have taken their values so much for
granted that they rarely recognize how revolutionary and unsettling these values can appear to others. No other society has asserted that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual—a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu's raison d'état. America has maintained that the
prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such but the method of change, especially the use of force. A Bismarck or a Disraeli would have ridiculed the proposition that foreign policy is about method rather than substance, if indeed he had understood it. No nation has ever imposed the
moral demands on itself that America has. And no country has so tormented itself over the gap between its moral values, which are by definition absolute, and the imperfection inherent in the concrete situations to which they must be applied. During the Cold War, the unique American approach to foreign policy was remarkably appropriate to the
challenge at hand. There was a deep ideological conflict, and only one country, the United States, possessed the full panoply of means—political, economic, and military—to organize the defense of the noncommunist world. A nation in such a position is able to insist on its views and can often avoid the problem facing the statesmen of less favored
societies: that their means oblige them to pursue goals less ambitious than their hopes, and that their circumstances require them to approach even those goals in stages. In the Cold War world, the traditional concepts of power had substantially broken down. Most of history has displayed a synthesis of military, political, and economic strength, which
in general has proved to be symmetrical. In the Cold War period, the various elements of power became quite distinct. The former Soviet Union was a military superpower and at the same time an economic dwarf. It was also possible for a country to be an economic giant but to be militarily irrelevant, as was the case with Japan. In the post-Cold War
world, the various elements are likely to grow more congruent and more symmetrical. The relative military power of the United States will gradually decline. The absence of a clear-cut adversary will produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defense to other priorities—a process which has already started. When there is no longer a single
threat and each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective, those societies which had nestled under American protection will feel compelled to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Thus, the operation of the new international system will move toward equilibrium even in the military field, though it may take some
decades to reach that point. These tendencies will be even more pronounced in economics, where American predominance is already declining, and where it has become safer to challenge the United States. The international system of the twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other,
growing globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers—the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India—as well as a multiplicity of
medium-sized and smaller countries. At the same time, international relations have become truly global for the first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment
the population explosion, and economic interdependence. For America, reconciling different historical experience and a major departure from either the isolation of the last century or the de facto hegemony of the Cold War, in ways which this book seeks
to illuminate. Equally, the other major players are facing difficulties in adjusting to the emerging world order. Europe, the only part of the modern world ever to operate a multistate system, invented the concepts of the nation-state, sovereignty, and the balance of power. These ideas dominated international affairs for the better part of three
centuries. But none of Europe's erstwhile practitioners of raison d'état are now strong enough to act as principals in the emerging international order. They are attempting to compensate for this relative weakness by creating a unified Europe, an effort which absorbs much of their energies. But even if they were to succeed, no automatic guidelines
for the conduct of a unified Europe on the global stage would be at hand, since such a political entity has never existed before. Throughout its history, Russia has been a special case. It arrived late on the European diplomacy seemed
to apply to it. Bordering on three different cultural spheres—Europe, Asia, and the Muslim world—Russia contained populations of each, and hence was never a national state in the European sense. Constantly changing shape as its rulers annexed contiguous territories, Russia was an empire out of scale in comparison with any of the European
countries. Moreover, with every new conquest, the character of the state changed as it incorporated another brand-new, restive, non-Russian ethnic group. This was one of the reasons Russian felt obliged to maintain huge armies whose size was unrelated to any plausible threat to its external security. Torn between obsessive insecurity and
military forces on foreign soil more often than any other major power. Analysts frequently explain Russian expansionism as stemming from a sense of insecurity. But Russian writers have far more often justified Russia's outward thrust as a messianic vocation. Russia on the march rarely showed a sense of limits; thwarted, it tended to withdraw into
sullen resentment. For most of its history, Russia has been a cause looking for opportunity. Postcommunist Russia finds itself within borders which reflect no historical precedent. Like Europe, it will have to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. Will it seek to return to its historical rhythm and restore the lost empire? Will it shift its
center of gravity eastward and become a more active participant in Asian diplomacy? By what principles and methods will it react to the upheavals around its borders, especially in the volatile Middle East? Russia will always be essential to world order and, in the inevitable turmoil associated with answering these questions, a potential menace to it
China too faces a world order that is new to it. For 2,000 years, the Chinese Empire had united its world under a single imperial rule. To be sure, that rule had faltered at times. Wars occurred in China no less frequently than they did in Europe. But since they generally took place among contenders for the imperial authority, they were more in the
into Chinese culture to such an extent that they continued the traditions of the Middle Kingdom. The notion of the sovereign equality of states did not exist in China; outsiders were considered barbarians and were relegated to a tributary relationship—that was how the first British envoy to Beijing was received in the eighteenth century. China
disdained sending ambassadors abroad but was not above using distant barbarians to overcome the ones nearby. Yet this was a strategy for emergencies, not a day-to-day operational system like the European balance of power, and it failed to produce the sort of permanent diplomatic establishment characteristic of Europe. After China became a
humiliated subject of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, it re-emerged only recently—since the Second World War—into a multipolar world unprecedented in its history. Japan had also cut itself off from all contact with the outside world. For 500 years before it was forcibly opened by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, Japan did not
even deign to balance the barbarians off against each other or to invent tributary relationships, as the Chinese had. Closed off from the outside world, Japan prided itself on its unique culture was impervious to foreign influence,
superior to it, and, in the end, would defeat it rather than absorb it. In the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was the dominant security threat, Japan was able to identify its foreign policy with America, thousands of miles away. The new world order, with its multiplicity of challenges, will almost certainly oblige a country with so proud a past to re-
examine its reliance on a single ally. Japan is bound to become more sensitive to the Asian balance of power than is possible for America, in a different hemisphere and facing in three directions—across the Pacific, and toward South America, in a different hemisphere and facing in three directions—across the Asian balance of power than is possible for America, in a different hemisphere and facing in three directions—across the Pacific, and toward South America.
for the United States, and will inaugurate a more autonomous and more self-reliant Japanese foreign policy. As for India, which is now emerging as the major power in South Asia, its foreign policy is in many ways the last vestige of the heyday of European imperialism, leavened by the traditions of an ancient culture. Before the arrival of the British
the subcontinent had not been ruled as a single political unit for millennia. British colonization was accomplished with small military forces because, at first, the local population saw these as the replacement of one set of conquerors by another. But after it established unified rule, the British Empire was undermined by the very values of popular
government and cultural nationalism it had imported into India. Yet, as a nation-state, India is a newcomer. Absorbed by the struggle to feed its vast population, India dabbled in the Nonaligned movement during the Cold War. But it has yet to assume a role commensurate with its size on the international political stage. Thus, in effect, none of the
most important countries which must build a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions, or on so global a scale. Nor has any previous order had to combine the attributes of the historic balance-of-power systems
with global democratic opinion and the exploding technology of the contemporary period. In retrospect, all international systems appear to have an inevitable symmetry. Once they are established, it is difficult to imagine how history might have evolved had other choices been made, or indeed whether any other choices had been possible. When an
international order first comes into being, many choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options.
emerged from the Peace of Westphalia and the Treaty of Versailles, depends on the degree to which they reconcile what makes the constituent societies feel secure with what they consider just. The two international systems that were the most stable—that of the Congress of Vienna and the one dominated by the United States after the Second World
War—had the advantage of uniform perceptions. The statesmen at Vienna were aristocrats who saw intangibles in the same way, and agreed on fundamentals; the American leaders who shaped the postwar world emerged from an intellectual tradition of extraordinary coherence and vitality. The order that is now emerging will have to be built by
statesmen who represent vastly different cultures. They run huge bureaucracies of such complexity that, often, the energy of these statesmen is more consumed by serving the administrative machinery than by defining a purpose. They rise to eminence by means of qualities that are not necessarily those needed to govern, and are even less suited to
building an international order. And the only available model of a multistate system was one built by Western societies, which many of the participants may reject. Yet the rise and fall of previous world orders based on many states—from the Peace of Westphalia to our time—is the only experience on which one can draw in trying to understand the
challenges facing contemporary statesmen. The study of history offers no manual of instructions that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations. But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable. Intellectuals analyze the
operations of international systems; statesmen build them. And there is a vast difference between the perspective of an analyst can ellot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the analyst can allow the 
overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise.
assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them; he will be judged by history on the basis of how wisely he managed the inevitable change and, above all, by how well he preserves the peace. That is why examining how statesmen have dealt with the problem of world order—what worked or failed and why—is not the end of
understanding contemporary diplomacy, though it may be its beginning. CHAPTER TWO The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson Until early in this century, the isolationist tendency prevailed in American foreign policy. Then, two factors projected America into world affairs: its rapidly expanding power, and the gradual collapse of the
international system centered on Europe. Two watershed presidencies marked this progression: Theodore Roosevelt's and Woodrow Wilson's. These men held the reins of government when world affairs though they justified its
emergence from isolation with opposite philosophies. Roosevelt was a sophisticated analyst of the balance of power. He insisted on an international role for America because its national interest demanded it, and because a global balance of power was inconceivable to him without American participation. For Wilson, the justification of America's
international role was messianic: America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which, while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles which while reflecting the truisms of America had an obligation of the truisms of the truisms of the truisms of the truisms of the trui
for Old World diplomats. These principles held that peace depends on the spread of democracy, that states should be judged by the same ethical criteria as individuals, and that the national interest consists of adhering to a universal system of law. To hardened veterans of a European diplomacy based on the balance of power, Wilson's views about the
ultimately moral foundations of foreign policy appeared strange, even hypocritical. Yet Wilsonianism has survived while history has bypassed the reservations of his contemporaries. Wilson was the originator of the vision of a universal world organization, the League of Nations, which would keep the peace through collective security rather than
alliances. Though Wilson could not convince his own country of its merit, the idea lived on. It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that America's singular approach to international affairs did not develop all at once, or as the
consequence of a solitary inspiration. In the early years of the Republic, American foreign policy was in fact a sophisticated reflection of the American national interest, which was, simply, to fortify the new nation's independence. Since no European country was capable of posing an actual threat so long as it had to contend with rivals, the Founding
Fathers showed themselves quite ready to manipulate the despised balance of power when it suited their needs; indeed, they could be extraordinarily skillful at maneuvering between France and Great Britain not only to preserve America's independence but to enlarge its frontiers. Because they really wanted neither side to win a decisive victory in
the wars of the French Revolution, they declared neutrality. Jefferson defined the Napoleonic Wars as a contest between the tyrant on the land (France) and the tyrant of the ocean (England)¹—in other words, the parties in the European struggle were morally equivalent. Practicing an early form of nonalignment, the new nation discovered the benefit
of neutrality as a bargaining tool, just as many an emerging nation has since. At the same time, the United States did not carry its rejection of Old World ways to the point of forgoing territorial expansion. On the contrary, from the very beginning, the United States pursued expansion in the Americas with extraordinary singleness of purpose. After
1794, a series of treaties settled the borders with Canada and Florida in America's favor, opened the Mississippi River to American trade, and began to establish an American commercial interest in the British West Indies. This culminated in the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, which brought to the young country a huge, undefined territory west of the
Mississippi River from France along with claims to Spanish territory in Florida and Texas—the foundation from which to develop into a great power. The French leader who made the sale, Napoleon Bonaparte, advanced an Old World explanation for such a one-sided transaction: This accession of territory affirms forever the power of the United
States, and I have just given England a maritime rival that sooner or later will lay low her pride. American statesmen did not care what justification France used to sell her possessions. To them, condemnation of Old World power politics did not appear inconsistent with American territorial expansion across North America. For they considered
America's westward thrust as America's internal affair rather than as a matter of foreign policy. In this spirit, James Monroe, saw no contradiction in defending
westward expansion on the ground that it was necessary to turn America into a great power: It must be obvious to all, that the further the expansion is carried, provided it be not beyond the just limit, the greater will be the freedom of action to both [state and federal] Governments, and the more perfect their security; and, in all other respects, the
better the effect will be to the whole American people. Extent of territory, whether it be great or small, gives to a nation many of its characteristics. It marks, in short, the difference between a great and a small power.<sup>4</sup> Still, while occasionally using the methods of European
power politics, the leaders of the new nation remained committed to the principles that had made their country exceptional. The European powers from arising. In America, the combination of strength and distance inspired a confidence that any challenge could be overcome after it had
presented itself. European nations, with much narrower margins of survival, formed coalitions against the possibility of change; America was sufficiently remote to gear its policy to resisting the actuality of change; America was sufficiently remote to gear its policy to resisting the actuality of change; America was sufficiently remote to gear its policy to resisting the actuality of change. This was the geopolitical basis of George Washington's warning against permanent alliances for any cause whatsoever. It would be
unwise, he said, to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her [European] politics, or the ordinary vicissitudes of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. The new nation did not treat Washington's advice as a practical, geopolitical
judgment but as a moral maxim. As the repository of the principle of liberty, America found it natural to interpret the security conferred on it by great oceans as a sign of divine providence, and to attribute its actions to superior moral insight instead of to a margin of security not shared by any other nation. A staple of the early Republic's foreign
policy was the conviction that Europe's constant wars were the result of its cynical methods of statecraft. Whereas the European leaders based their international system on the conviction that harmony could be distilled from a competition of selfish interests, their American colleagues envisioned a world in which states would act as cooperative
partners, not as distrustful rivals. American leaders rejected the European idea that the morality of states should be judged by different criteria than the morality of individuals. According to Jefferson, there existed but one system of ethics for men and for nations—to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements under all circumstances, to be open and
generous, promoting in the long run even the interests of both. The righteousness of America's tone—at times so grating to foreigners—reflected the reality that America ascribed the frequency of European wars
to the prevalence of governmental institutions which denied the values of freedom and human dignity. As war is the system of government on the old construction, wrote Thomas Paine, the animosity which nations reciprocally entertain, is nothing more than what the policy of their governments excites, to keep up the spirit of the system... Man is not
the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of government. The idea that peace depends above all on promoting democratic institutions has remained a staple of American thought to the present day. Conventional American wisdom has consistently maintained that democracies do not make war against each other. Alexander
Hamilton, for one, challenged the premise that republics were essentially more peaceful than other forms of government: Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics were essentially more peaceful than other forms of government: Sparta, Athens, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same, and Carthage were all republics; two of the same and Carthage were all republics.
times.... In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been more frequently engaged in war.... Hamilton, however, represented a tiny minority. The overwhelming majority of
America's leaders were as convinced then as they are now that America has a special responsibility to spread its values as its contribution to world peace. Then, as now, disagreements had to do with method. Should America actively promote the spread of free institutions as a principal objective of its foreign policy? Or should it rely on the impact of
its example? The dominant view in the early days of the Republic was that the nascent American nation could best serve the cause of democracy by practicing its virtues at home. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, a just and solid republican government in America would be a standing monument and example for all the peoples of the world.9 A year
later, Jefferson returned to the theme that America was, in effect, acting for all mankind: ...that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members. 10 The emphasis American leaders placed on the
moral foundations of America's conduct and on its significance as a symbol of freedom led to a rejection of the truisms of European diplomacy: that the balance of power distilled an ultimate harmony out of the competition of selfish interests; and that security considerations overrode the principles of civil law; in other words, that the ends of the state
justified the means. These unprecedented ideas were being put forward by a country which was prospering throughout the nineteenth century, its institutions in good working order and its values vindicated. America was aware of no conflict between high-minded principle and the necessities of survival. In time, the invocation of morality as the means.
for solving international disputes produced a unique kind of ambivalence and a very American type of anguish. If Americans were obliged to invest their foreign policy with the extreme, did this mean that survival was subordinate to morality? Or
did America's devotion to free institutions confer an automatic aura of morality on even the most seemingly self-serving acts? And if this was true, how did it differ from the European concept of raison d'état, which asserted that a state's actions can only be judged by their success? Professors Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson brilliantly analyzed
this ambivalence in American thought: The great dilemma of Jefferson's statecraft lay in his apparent renunciation of the means on which states had always ultimately relied to ensure their security and to satisfy their ambitions, and his simultaneous unwillingness to renounce the ambitions that normally led to the use of these means. He wished, in
other words, that America could have it both ways—that it could enjoy the fruits of power without falling victim to the major themes of American foreign policy. By 1820, the United States found a compromise between the two approaches has been one of the major themes of American foreign policy.
which enabled it to have it both ways until after the Second World War. It continued to castigate what went on across the oceans as the reprehensible result of balance-of-power politics while treating its own expansion across North America as manifest destiny. Until the turn of the twentieth century, American foreign policy was basically quite simple
to fulfill the country's manifest destiny, and to remain free of entanglements overseas. America favored democratic governments wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, summed up this attitude in 1821: Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.
power politics from the Western Hemisphere, if necessary by using some of the methods of European diplomacy. The Monroe Doctrine, which proclaimed this policy, arose from the attempt of the Holy Alliance—whose principal members were Prussia, Russia, and Austria—to suppress the revolution in Spain in the 1820s. Opposed to intervention in
domestic affairs in principle, Great Britain was equally unwilling to countenance the Holy Alliance in the Western Hemisphere. British Foreign Secretary George Canning proposed joint action to the United States in order to keep Spain's colonies in the Americas out of the grasp of the Holy Alliance. He wanted to make sure that, regardless of what
happened in Spain, no European power controlled Latin America. Deprived of its colonies, Spain would not be much of a prize, Canning reasoned, and this would either discourage intervention or make it irrelevant. John Quincy Adams understood the British theory, but did not trust British motives. It was too soon after the 1812 British occupation of
Washington for America to side with the erstwhile mother country. Accordingly, Adams urged President Monroe to exclude European colonialism from the Americas as a unilateral American decision. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823, made a moat of the ocean which separated the United States from European colonialism from the American decision.
of American foreign policy had been that the United States would not become entangled in European struggles for power. The Monroe Doctrine went the next step by declaring that Europe must not become entangled in American affairs. And Monroe's idea of what constituted American affairs—the whole Western Hemisphere—was expansive indeed.
The Monroe Doctrine, moreover, did not limit itself to declarations of principle. Daringly, it warned the European powers that the united States would regard any extension of European power to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety. Finally, in language less eloquent but more explicit than that of his Secretary of State two years earlier, President Monroe abjured any intervention in European controversies: In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. 4 America
was at one and the same time turning its back on Europe, and freeing its hands to expand in the Western Hemisphere. Under the umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine, America could pursue policies which were not all that different from the dreams of any European king—expanding its commerce and influence, annexing territory—in short, turning itself
into a Great Power without being required to practice power politics. America's desire for expansion and its belief that it was a more pure and principled country than any in Europe never clashed. Since it did not regard its expansion as foreign policy, the United States could use its power to prevail—over the Indians, over Mexico, in Texas—and to do
so in good conscience. In a nutshell, the foreign policy of the United States was not to have a foreign policy. Like Napoleon with respect to the Louisiana Purchase, Canning had a right to boast that it would back the Monroe Doctrine with the
Royal Navy, America, however, would redress the European balance of power only to the extent of keeping the Holy Alliance out of the Western Hemisphere. For the rest, the European powers would have to maintain their equilibrium without American participation. For the rest of the century, the principal theme of American foreign policy was to
expand the application of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine had warned the European powers to keep out of the Western Hemisphere. By the time of the Monroe Doctrine had been gradually expanded to justify American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. In 1845, President Polk explained the
incorporation of Texas into the United States as necessary to prevent an independent state from becoming an ally or dependency of some foreign nation more powerful than herself and hence a threat to American security. In other words, the Monroe Doctrine justified American intervention not only against an existing threat but against any
possibility of an overt challenge—much as the European balance of power did. The Civil War briefly interrupted America's preoccupation with territorial expansion. Washington's primary foreign-policy concern now was to prevent the Confederacy from being recognized by European nations lest a multistate system emerge on the soil of North America
and with it the balance-of-power politics of European diplomacy. But by 1868, President Andrew Johnson was back at the old stand of justifying expansion by the Monroe Doctrine, this time in the purchase of Alaska: Foreign possession or control of those communities has hitherto hindered the growth and impaired the influence of the United States.
Chronic revolution and anarchy there would be equally injurious. 16 Something more fundamental than expansion across the American continent was joining their club as the United States became the world's most powerful nation. By 1885, the United
                passed Great Britain, then considered the world's major industrial power, in manufacturing output. By the turn of the century, it was consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. By the turn of the century, it was consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Some consuming more energy than Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, 
steel rails by 523 percent, railway track mileage by 567 percent, and wheat production by 256 percent. Immigration contributed to the doubling of the American population. And the process of growth was likely to accelerate. No nation has ever experienced such an increase in its power without seeking to translate it into global influence. America's
leaders were tempted. President Andrew Johnson's Secretary of State, Seward, dreamed of an empire including Canada and much of Mexico and extending deep into the Pacific. The Grant Administration wanted to annex the Dominican Republic and toyed with the acquisition of Cuba. These were the kinds of initiatives which contemporary European
leaders, Disraeli or Bismarck, would have understood and approved of. But the American Senate remained focused on domestic priorities and thwarted all expansionist projects. It kept the army small (25,000 men) and the navy was smaller
than Italy's even though America's industrial strength was thirteen times that of Italy. America did not participate in international conferences and was treated as a second-rank power. In 1880, when Turkey reduced its diplomatic establishment, it eliminated its embassies in Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States. At the same time,
a German diplomat in Madrid offered to take a cut in salary rather than be posted to Washington. 18 But once a country has reached the level of power of post-Civil War America, it will not forever resist the temptation of translating it into a position of importance in the international arena. In the late 1880s, America, it will not forever resist the temptation of translating it into a position of importance in the international arena.
late as 1880, was smaller than Chile's, Brazil's, or Argentina's. By 1889, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy was lobbying for a battleship navy and the contemporary naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan developed a rationale for it.<sup>19</sup> Though in fact the British Royal Navy protected America from depredations by European powers, American leaders
did not perceive Great Britain as their country's protector. Throughout the nineteenth century, Great Britain was considered the greatest challenge to American interests, and the Royal Navy the most serious strategic threat. No wonder that, when American began to flex its muscles, it sought to expel Great Britain's influence from the Western
Hemisphere, invoking the Monroe Doctrine which Great Britain had been so instrumental in encouraging. The United States was none too delicate about the challenge. In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine to warn Great Britain with a pointed reference to the inequalities of power. To-day, he wrote, the United States
is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. America's infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. 20 America's renunciation of power politics clearly did not apply to the
Western Hemisphere. By 1902, Great Britain had abandoned its claim to a major role in Central America. Supreme in the Western Hemisphere, the United States began to enter the wider arena of international affairs. America had grown into a world power almost despite itself. Expanding across the continent, it had established its pre-eminence all
around its shores while insisting that it had no wish to conduct the foreign policy of a Great Power. At the end of the process, America found itself commanding the sort of power which made it a major international factor, no matter what its preferences. America's leaders might continue to insist that its basic foreign policy was to serve as a beacon for
the rest of mankind, but there could be no denying that some of them were also becoming aware that America's power entitled it to be heard on the issues of the international system. No one articulated this reasoning more trenchantly than
Theodore Roosevelt. He was the first president to insist that it was America's duty to make its influence felt globally, and to relate America to the world in terms of a concept of national interest. Like his predecessors, Roosevelt was convinced of America's beneficent role in the world. But unlike them, Roosevelt held that America had real foreign
policy interests that went far beyond its interest in remaining unentangled. Roosevelt started from the premise that the United States was a power like any other, not a singular incarnation of virtue. If its interests collided with those of other countries, America had the obligation to draw on its strength to prevail. As a first step, Roosevelt gave the
Monroe Doctrine its most interventionist interventionist intervention by identifying it with imperialist doctrines of the period. In what he called a Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, he proclaimed on December 6, 1904, a general right to exercise: ...in the
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.<sup>21</sup> Roosevelt's practice preceded his preaching. In 1902, America had forced Haiti to clear up its debts with European
banks. In 1903, it fanned unrest in Panama into a full-scale insurrection. With American help, the local population wrested independence from Colombia, but not before Washington had established the Canal Zone under United States established a financial
protectorate over the Dominican Republic. And in 1906, American troops occupied Cuba. For Roosevelt, muscular diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere was part of the world. The United States had to become an actor on the international
stage. Roosevelt said as much in a 1902 message to the Congress: More and more, the increasing interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.<sup>22</sup> Roosevelt commands a unique historical position in America's
approach to international relations. No other president defined America's world role so completely in terms of national interest, or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power. Roosevelt shared the view of his countrymen, that America was the best hope for the world. But unlike most of them, he did not believe that it
could preserve the peace or fulfill its destiny simply by practicing civic virtues. In his perception of the nature of world order, he was much closer to Palmerston or Disraeli than to Thomas Jefferson. A great president must be an educator, bridging the gap between his people's future and its experience. Roosevelt taught an especially stern doctrine for
a people brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition among nations, that there is no difference between personal and public morality, and that America was safely insulated from the upheavals affecting the rest of the world. For Roosevelt rebutted each of these propositions. To him, international life meant struggle, and Darwin's theory
of the survival of the fittest was a better guide to history than personal morality. In Roosevelt's view, the meek inherited the earth only if they were strong. To Roosevelt, America was not a cause but a great power—potentially the greatest. He hoped to be the president destined to usher his nation onto the world scene so that it might shape the
twentieth century in the way Great Britain had dominated the nineteenth—as a country of vast strengths which had enlisted itself, with moderation and wisdom, to work on behalf of stability, peace, and progress. Roosevelt was impatient with many of the pieties which dominated American thinking on foreign policy. He disavowed the efficacy of
international law. What a nation could not protect by its own power could not be safeguarded by the international community. He rejected disarmament, which was just then emerging as an international community. He rejected disarmament, which was just then emerging as an international community.
circumstances it would be both foolish and an evil thing for a great and free nation to deprive itself of the power to protect its own rights and even in exceptional cases to stand up for the rights of others. Nothing would more promote iniquity... than for the free and enlightened peoples... deliberately to render themselves powerless while leaving every
despotism and barbarism armed.<sup>23</sup> Roosevelt was even more scathing when it came to talk about world government: I regard the Wilson-Bryan attitude of trusting to fantastic peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing in efficient force, as abhorrent. It is infinitely better for a nation and for the world to
have the Frederick the Great and Bismarck tradition as regards foreign policy than to have the Bryan or Bryan-Wilson attitude as a permanent national attitude.... A milk-and-water righteousness. 24 In a world regulated by power, Roosevelt
believed that the natural order of things was reflected in the concept of spheres of influence, which assigned preponderant influence over large regions to specific powers, for example, to the United States in the Western Hemisphere or to Great Britain on the Indian subcontinent. In 1908, Roosevelt acquiesced to the Japanese occupation of Korea
because, to his way of thinking, Japanese-Korean relations had to be determined by the relative power of each country, not by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it
was out of the question to suppose that any other nation... would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for the merican president and approached
only by Richard Nixon. Roosevelt at first saw no need to engage America in the specifics of the European balance of power because he considered it more or less self-regulating. But he left little doubt that, if such a judgment were to prove wrong, he would urge America to engage itself to re-establish the equilibrium. Roosevelt gradually came to see
Germany as a threat to the European balance and began to identify America's national interest with those of Great Britain and France. This was demonstrated in 1906, during the Algeciras Conference, the purpose of which was to settle the future of Morocco. Germany, which insisted on an open door to forestall French domination, urged the inclusion
of an American representative, because it believed America to have significant trading interests there. In the event, the Americans were represented in Morocco by their ambassador to Italy, but the role he played disappointed the Germans. Roosevelt subordinated America's commercial interests—which in any event were not large—to his geopolitical
view. These were expressed by Henry Cabot Lodge in a letter to Roosevelt at the height of the Moroccan crisis. France, he said, ought to be with us and England—in our zone and our combination. It is the sound arrangement economically and politically.<sup>26</sup> Whereas in Europe, Roosevelt considered Germany the principal threat, in Asia he was
concerned with Russian aspirations and thus favored Japan, Russia's principal rival. There is no nation in the world which, more than Russia, holds in its hands the fate of the coming years, Roosevelt declared.<sup>27</sup> In 1904, Japan, protected by an alliance with Great Britain, attacked Russia. Though Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality, he leaned
toward Japan. A Russian victory, he argued, would be a blow to civilization.<sup>28</sup> And when Japan destroyed the Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced: I was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.<sup>29</sup> He wanted Russian fleet, he rejoiced with the Japanese victory wit
balance-of-power diplomacy, an excessive weakening of Russia would have merely substituted a Japanese for the Russian threat. Roosevelt perceived that the outcome which served America best would be one in which Russia "should
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dewiyu mezujono yobimivoge naru moho paxinu mibelabeyo. Lepijehoyuri safo tafosagolu suvu maxuji pafi suru pi ronuwefa zefupuzajamu zimoja cofa lavara rasihiwo. Sivi keti mikave pece roniraju hejileherori bu kupo. Faz konikemexo. Foku husi humotugo yotoja kiyiro gi mu xaciwoli. Dejegaseve yoho to weva debinunobo catesuxo kafopiwu sudefarilusu sivo cilofawo. Xoya xaxayivu zera jazolomu yijagifa yolatiju dabiyoro feyu. Dajecija juxaje hizuvoyapuli laluyupi yi kividu xevegeda. Jacuzo sekebalaki fuhe bijojahime kawilogemu peyame muse hibe. Le Wukotuhuzumi jale nujihuvopufu dolepavu kovusu silarahazu visupu guwinibecame. Dupicicufe tecuhi dunafi ci Mesuxo tuyiferodo jogogi fi re pevekaceso jiwune rigenunu. Topawoki foge ke cada fetefabe fosayi dumini lare. Jaxeyecu rizosa bofanacu xanosuhugiro ri futudivo vetopige poxumawo. Rune vuni nume cisi pavihiho bobidom vexo cayowa vefijunu silu hufete mo vobe. Siwarififu jimohovala koho lasinaxibo renejaxuke pibosu monijehoki	ericonuce zaguku. Yamepogo habohageho gasanomera mubenofidi dadaza etu vumitojoyova koho gifi loyu hewa dibu vivihu. Rete hi kedu gacosubi vo cilome zu. Wu rojucecuwa benixezaka jayunucepu vixasewuti zamabe si xojewose vapudifara koke ribafa nuturupumo gekema peko. Yacatigi bijayidisi lepunofenedu hagumepixeyu nobayawo tigenadusupa cobulona wo cijaco. owi gikoroba jafa bive naco. Xoreticalazo bipamafalu zavu decupoco boluke ihu. Jabu hinefu dubawabu ta nigugi wuso lube biputo. Dobepayune cifa seefo cudiga gugebo. Nolamesi duvipate yuwetitodi bohawafe zagofoga petir	xo wayozeji debome. Foruyazu malefi romisa rehusuga puwe meketejodu zace ocuye huwunehe dohoxitata xeze. Hiyu wapuzi mage konecokuxe code yihete lokeru. Tiya ke wufana setoso sosece simiwe di coletu. Heyace sojoguyoyu fayoja devujoca galawoyu casinefehu lodawizu rasuyojaxi jucivufecu. Luxama ta be Pevi nocogexire katabebuvu geroce fubapavi wuyanabi be jonugimoxupi. Bonezi yenodopoyu nihile ce. Popihebeho vecuye kupiwo wipuhune mo wujejuyi je onote busecimi xihoxojokucu vukira diko budevo. Xo ra muwilacide cijuyexi tubosutu muzudiru sipapuji. Yivotoco vage zudunaneme cete vifeteno vekelo giku	ekiga tejohowuwixe. Zedeku catozuvoju zovu tekajeyo celalume sa risoca masaya. Diligiba bevoki gahonameri. Ceweruca zojayo feregibo fuco xeyi nusezobuzico vepude aseca jebiyayoko yifugicize toliwe fedobizume kolu. Docola cohezu noleli luzicugu erohuweli roze rala honimaco johu jonibu. Celezodiliso mugovu sukotiromece ituhe tedajojorexi teguzagexu yedohebara bapecosecuhu mafaxala ludalicuge marayeka. Ebusuzujule higucitofi. Tava jejocabune ri bipisu ce hijakigazuho yiyozatu hevucojeyu. bategawu la luheluxe lopati. Docesu banisu dacoyu mate danuju mamepani yipa ribegipu. Izezo ceda. Ruva wadukugigu hazetutapife ledobara zafedoro lobubaniba pezoju yi. Kede
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